Science, pseudoscience, evidence-based practice and post truth by González-Méijome, José Manuel
Journal of Optometry (2017) 10, 203--204
www.journalofoptometry.org
EDITORIAL
Science,  pseudoscience,  evidence-based  practice and
post truth
Ciencia,  pseudociencia,  práctica  basada  en la  evidencia  y posverdad
José M. González-Méijome
University  of  Minho  School  of Science,  Clinical  and  Experimental  Optometry  Research  Lab  (CEORLab),
Department  and  Centre  of  Physics,  4710-057,  Portugal
We  live  a  time  when  it is easier  to  question  the value  of
statins  to  fight  cholesterol  or  the efficacy  of  vaccination  and
replace  these  treatments  with  homeopathic  substances  that
lack  any  demonstrated  therapeutic  effect,  promoting  BILIEF
to  the  category  of  PSEUDO-SCIENCE, than  rely  on  evidence-
based  facts  supported  by  the  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD. These  are
challenging  times  for  clinicians  and we  need to  be  aware  of
the  ‘‘siren  songs’’,  question  easy  TRUTH  even  when  it  looks
EVIDENT  and  the  recent  so-called  POST  TRUTH  where  beliefs
seem  to be  stronger  than FACTS,  and  find  the  path  for  safe
EVIDENCE-BASED  PRACTICE.  This  brief  paragraph  contains
several  terms  and constructs  that  we  often  use, hear  or  read
but  the  definitions  of  which  require  more  careful  reflection,
the  goal  of  this  editorial.
Paradoxically  these are both  great  and  hard times  for
science.  On  the  one hand,  we  are  witnessing  the highest
research  activity  we  have  ever  known  in optometry  and
vision  science  and  in  every  discipline  in  general.  Unfortu-
nately,  this  is  also  proving  a  perfect  culture  medium  for
clinical  practice  that  is  far  from  being  supported  by  good
research.  Such  practice  has  always  existed,  yet  it has  been
presumed  that  increased  research  activity  would  either
provide  proof  for  it or  abolish  it completely.  Instead,  in some
cases,  neither  of these  two  options  takes place  and  this
practice  has  found  an ecosystem  in which  to  thrive  and  is
even  covered  with  a veneer  of  credibility  by  being  published
here  and  there.
We  should  not confuse  ‘‘evident’’  thoughts  with  facts
supported  by  ‘‘evidence’.  Evident  is  sometimes  used
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synonymously  for  ‘‘obvious’’, something  that  can  be  seen.
However,  a  better  definition  would be that  the word
‘‘evident’’  refers  to  something  ‘‘clearly  understood’’.  How-
ever,  personal  thoughts  can  be  evident  simply  because  they
make  sense  according  to  some  biased  facts  or  because
they  coincide  with  general  beliefs.  Evidence,  however,
is defined  as  ‘‘the  available  body  of  facts  or  informa-
tion  indicating  whether  a belief  or  proposition  is true
or  valid’’. Therefore,  we  should  not confuse  beliefs  with
evidence  and  should  always  seek  confirmatory  observa-
tions  (facts),  properly  collected  and  analysed.  Ultimately,
evidence  can  confirm  our  beliefs  but  not  the reverse.
The  prominent  role  of facts  mentioned  above  takes  us
to  another  relevant  concept  --  ‘‘post  truth’’. The  term  is
increasingly  present  in  the media  and  in 2016  was  declared
the  word  of  the  year  by  the Oxford  Dictionary.1 It is  an
adjective  used  to  describe  ‘‘circumstances  in which  objec-
tive  facts  are less  influential  in shaping  public  opinion  than
appeals  to  emotion  and personal  beliefs’’  or  according  to
the  Cambridge  Dictionary  ‘‘a  situation  in  which  people  are
more likely  to  accept  an argument  based  on  their  emotions
and  beliefs,  rather  than one  based  on facts’’. Interestingly,
by  the end  of this year --  2017  --  its  translation  to  Spanish
‘‘posverdad’’  will  be  indexed  in  the Official  Dictionary  of the
Language  by  the Royal  Academy  of  Language  (Real  Academia
de  la Lengua).  In  some  way,  defining  ‘‘truth’’  itself  will  help
us  understand  the  concept  of  post-truth.  ‘‘Truth’’,  a  noun,
is  defined  as  the quality  of  being  true,  while  ‘‘true’’  is  an
adjective  that  means  ‘‘in  accordance  with  fact  or  reality’’.
Another  definition  is  ‘‘being  accurate  or  exact’’. Both defini-
tions are  very  important  from  the  scientific  point  of view  as
they  imply  that  before  we  attribute  this  quality  to  something
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we  need  to  ensure  that  is  accurate  and  factual,  therefore  it
must  be  verifiable  using  the appropriate  methods.  From  the
philosophical  perspective  and  according  to  the Neo-classical
Correspondence  Theory  a belief  is  true  if  there exists  an
appropriate  entity  --  a fact --  to  which  it corresponds  as
described  in the Stanford  Encyclopaedia.2
Altogether,  these  definitions  tell us  that  truth  should
not  be  based  on  personal  beliefs,  but  should  be con-
firmed  with  facts.  However,  in  the scientific  field,  facts
are  not  easily  accepted  without  question  and multiple
verifications.  One  way  to  achieve  such  confirmation  is
through  the  Scientific  Method  ‘‘consisting  in  systematic
observation,  measurement,  and  experiment,  and  formula-
tion,  testing  and  modification  of hypotheses’’. When  the
scientific  method  goes  beyond  observation  and  is  com-
plemented  with  accurate  measurements,  preferably  with
something  other  than  our  eyes,  indissociably  linked  to  pre-
vious  ‘‘experiences’’  of  our  brain,  it allows  us to  make
judgements.  In fact,  as  the astrophysicist  Neil  deGrasse
Tyson  writes  in his  recent  book,  such experience  ‘‘is  more
often  than  not a satchel  or  preconceived  ideas,  post-
conceived  notions,  and  outright  bias’’.3
The  abovementioned  confusion  between  beliefs  and  facts
leads  us  to  another  concept  highlighted  in this  editorial,
pseudoscience. To better  understand  the full  concept  of
‘‘pseudoscience’’,  instead  of making  a direct  semantic
interpretadion  as  ‘‘false  science’’,  it  is  a good  idea  to  first
define  science  itself.  Science  is  the  ‘‘understanding  of  the
mechanisms  that govern  our  world,  from  the fundamen-
tal  laws  of the  universe  to  the biological  processes  of  the
simplest  living  organisms  to  the  complexity  of  the human
body’’.  Science  is  ultimately  a way  (maybe  the best  way)  to
acquire  knowledge.  It  may  be  the  best way  because  it  does
not  work  with  pre-conceived  beliefs  seeking  confirmation.
Instead,  science  works  with  hypotheses  to  explain  facts  and
the  more  hypotheses  science  rejects,  the closer  the  scientist
gets  to  a  scientific  explanation.  Another  important  conse-
quence  deriving  from  the  above  is  that  we  should  not  confuse
‘‘causality’’  with  ‘‘casualty’’.  An association  between  two
parameters  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  one  is  the cause
of  the  other.  We  should  first  consider  the  possibility  of  a
casual  combination  and  make  any  effort  to  reject  such  rela-
tionship  with  other  potential  bias  and exclude  any  other
justification  for our  findings  before  we accept  the explana-
tion  and  attribute  the  causality  of  a  given  event.  Only  when
we  have  no  additional  justification  for  the  findings  should
we  accept  the  causal  relationship.
There  are,  however,  many  other  sources  of  knowledge
including  traditional  beliefs  and  expert  opinion  that  we
should  not  ignore.  This  is  where  we  should reintroduce  the
definition  of  pseudoscience  according  to  the Oxford  Dic-
tionary  as ‘‘a  collection  of  beliefs  or  practices  mistakenly
regarded  as being  based  on  scientific  method’’.2 There-
fore,  pseudoscience  arises  when those  sources  of  knowledge
assume  the  role  of  science  itself.  The  reader  might find  it
helpful  to  recognise  pseudoscience  by  some  of  its character-
istics  according  to  some  authors:  used  to  be contradictory,
makes  exaggerated  or  unprovable  claims,  relies  on confir-
mation  bias  rather  than  rigorous  attempts  at  refutation,
lack  of  openness  to  evaluation  by other  experts,  and
absence  of  systematic  practices  when  developing  theories.
Social  media  and  means  of dissemination  of  all  kinds  includ-
ing blogs,  forums,  discussion  groups  etc.  also  provide  fuel
for  these approaches  to  gain  exaggerated  attention,  pro-
moting  such forms  of  knowledge  to  the  rank of science  and
furthering  the  emergence  of  pseudoscience.
These  considerations  lead me  to  conclusions  that  might
be  relevant  for  everyone  who  is involved  in  research,  clini-
cal  practice  or  both.  First, not  all  the treatment  approaches
we  follow  today  are based  on  scientific  principles.  In  fact,
there  are several  examples  of  treatments  that  have  proved
to  be  beneficial  but  whose  scientific  bases are  not yet
fully  understood.  Second,  even  when we  have no science-
based  approach  to  fully  understand  their  mode of action,
we  might  feel  compelled  to  use  them  not  because  obscure
interests  motivate  us,  but  because  we  have  been  able  to
confirm  their  results  in successive  systematic  observations
in  well-designed,  research  experiments  that  are  not biased
by  our  beliefs  or  preconceptions.  Third, the requirement  of
evidence-based  practice  should  make  us  seek  robust  proof  of
systematic  behaviours.  This  is  generally  provided  by clinical
trials  that  minimise  the risk  of  bias  by  picking  statistically
significant  sample  sizes,  using control  groups,  randomising
the treatment  and control  subjects  and whenever  possi-
ble,  eliminating  the  potential  placebo  effect  by  masking
subjects and/or  investigators.  Fourth, we  should  use  the
most  objective  and repeatable  measurement  methods  we
can  in order  to  minimise  the  impact  of our  beliefs  and
observation  bias  on  the  final  outcome  that  we  are  testing.
Fifth,  we  should  never  accept  as  truth,  science-based  or
evidence-based  practice  that  which  in fact might  be per-
sonal  opinions,  isolated  case  reports,  non-systematic  case
series,  or  severely  biased  ‘‘scientific’’  reports.  Ultimately
this  does  not  mean  that  those  forms  of  knowledge  are  not
relevant  to  the  advancement  of  clinical  practice  and  science
itself,  but  they  should  not  be  overvalued  or  taken  as  givens
without  any  further  questioning  and validation  by  testing
(back  to  Third).
As  health  care  professionals,  we  should  be  ready  to
accept  that  our  beliefs are not  more  important  than  facts.
Moreover,  the  wider  our  experience,  the more  powerful  our
beliefs  might  be.  And whether  we  are  more  clinically  ori-
ented  or  research  oriented,  we  need  to  bear in mind  that
science  makes  no  effort  to  confirm  beliefs  or  hypothesis.
Instead,  it  attempts  to reject any potential  explanation  until
there  is  one  that  cannot  be rejected  and  therefore  might  be
linked  to the observation  we  have made.  This  must  confirm
the power  of  science  in serving  clinical  practice.
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